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BALANCING ACTS: BOWSHER v. SYNAR, GRAMMRUDMAN-HOLLINGS, AND BEYOND
L. Harold Levinsont
The Supreme Court performed a judicial balancing act in Bowsher v. Synar.' It upheld some, but not all, types of congressional
experiments with macrobudgeting. In reaching this conclusion the
Court failed to decide some issues that would have provided sorely
needed guidance on potential budgetary problems.
In addition, the Bowsher litigation 2 required a balancing of competing contentions made by various factions within the government.
On one side, the Comptroller General and the leadership of each
House of Congress 3 urged validation of the entire Gramm-RudmanHollings Act;4 on the other side, the executive branch of the United
States and some individual members of Congress, together with unions representing affected citizens, urged invalidation of that part of
the Act which empowers the Comptroller General to trigger automatic spending cuts. 5 The Court held that this triggering provision
unconstitutionally conferred executive power upon the Comptroller
General, a nonexecutive officer. The Court then invited Congress to
reduce spending by adopting ajoint resolution pursuant to the Act's
fallback provision. 6 While not expressly ruling on the fallback provision's validity, the Court's invitation to use this provision suggests
t
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.B.A. 1957, LL.B. 1962, University of
Miami; LL.M. 1964, New York University;J.S.D. 1974, Columbia University.
1 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
2 A three-judge district court, exercising jurisdiction conferred by the Act itself, 2
U.S.C. § 922(a) (Supp. III 1985), held part of the statute invalid. Synar v. United States,
626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986). The appellants then appealed directly to the Supreme
Court, invoking the Act's direct appeal provision. 2 U.S.C. § 922(b) (Supp. III 1985).
3
Ex-Senator Howard Baker and the National Tax Limitation Committee, as amici
curiae, filed additional briefs in support of the appellants' position.
4 See Arguments Before the Court, 54 U.S.L.W. 3709 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1986). The popular title, "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act," refers to the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(99 Stat.) 1037. Bowsher addressed §§ 251-275 of the Act (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901922 (Supp. III 1985)).
5 See Arguments Before the Court, supra note 4, at 3710. The appellees in the Supreme
Court were the United States (represented by the Solicitor General), Congressman Mike
Synar (represented by Alan Morrison of Public Citizen Litigation Group) and the National Treasury Employees Union. Six amici curiae filed additional briefs in support of
the appellees' position.
6 106 S. Ct. at 3193-94. Congress quickly adopted the joint resolution. See infra
text accompanying notes 8-10.
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its approval. 7
Congress and the President quickly responded to Bowsher by
performing their own budget balancing acts. Less than a month after the Supreme Court's decision, Congress passed, and the President approved, a joint resolution 8 in accordance with the fallback
provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, ratifying the President's sequestration order 9 for fiscal year (FY) 1986.10
Meanwhile, Congress worked on the budget for FY 1987. When
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) warned that the first congressional version
of the FY 1987 budget would necessitate an across-the-board cut, l I
12
Congress in October- 1986 revised its budget to avoid such a cut.
During the same month, Congress enacted a revised income tax law
which, among other things, may make it easier to predict revenues
for future budget projections.13
7
106 S. Ct. at 3193-94. In American Federation of Government Employees v.
United States, 634 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1986), government employees and their union

challenged the validity of the fallback provision. Noting that Congress had not yet exercised the fallback provision, and could exercise it only by a joint resolution, the district
court refused to rule on the validity of the provision, because such a ruling would constitute an advisory opinion on the validity of future legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision a few weeks after Bowsher, although in the meantime Congress had
enacted ajoint resolution to exercise the fallback provision. 107 S. Ct. 43 (1986); see also
National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 633 F. Supp. 511 (D.D.C.) (pensioners not deprived of "property" when spending cuts eliminated cost of living adjustments (COLAs) to which pensioners had statutory entitlement), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 261
(1986).
8 Act ofJuly 31, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-366, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMIN. NEWS
(100 Stat.) 773.
9 51 Fed. Reg. 4291 (1986) [hereinafter Sequestration Order]; see also OMB &
CBO, SEQUESTRATION REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986 (providing underlying details of

joint resolution and sequestration order), reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 1918 (1986); COMPTROLLER GENERAL, BUDGET REDUCTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986 (commenting on

OMB/CBO Report), reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 2813 (1986).
10 The term "fiscal year 1986" or "FY 1986" means the fiscal year ending on Sept.
30, 1986.
11 OMB & CBO, INITIAL SEQUESTRATION REPORT FOR FY 1987, at 11 (table 6) (suggesting sequestration percentages for FY 1987 of 5.6% for defense and 7.67o for

nondefense), reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 29,829, 29,841 (1986) (table 6). The Comptroller
General projected higher sequestration percentages of 6.7% and 9.4%o respectively.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET REDUCTIONS FOR FY 1987: REVIEW OF INITIAL

OMB/CBO REPORT UNDER THE DEFICIT CONTROL ACT 2 (1986) (on file at Cornell Law

Review).
12 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) ; see also Major Provisions of the Fiscal 1987
Reconciliation Bill, 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2790 (1986) (summarizing Act). Near that
time, Congress enacted a joint resolution providing continuing appropriations for FY
1987. Act of Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

(100 Stat.) 1783; see also Wehr, Congress Clears $576 Billion Spending Measure, 44 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2584 (1986) (summarizing resolution); infra note 82 (difficulties preceding
resolution's enactment).
13 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
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Bowsher apparently defused pressures for more drastic deficit
control measures, such as a constitutional amendment or a statutory
line-item veto,1 4 but the budget war is likely to flare up again, especially after FY 1987. The first two years of the Gramm-RudmanHollings budget cycle present less risk of crisis than do later years.
For example, after complete elimination of pensioners' cost of living
adjustments (COLAs), the across-the-board spending reductions required in FY 1986 to meet the deficit reduction target were only
4.9% for defense accounts and 4.3% for nondefense accounts.' 5
Because of the unique timetable for FY 1986 as the transitional year,
the affected governmental agencies had already reduced spending
to comply with the President's sequestration order' 6 before Congress voted to exercise the fallback provision. 17 Thus, the congressional vote merely ratified the agencies' past cuts in spending.
Furthermore, the budget reconciliation for FY 1987 reflects
some nonrecurring savings achieved through questionable accounting procedures and the projected sale of governmental assets.' 8
NEWS (100 Stat.) -.
Although revenues may become easier to predict after the Act
takes effect, its transitional features are likely to produce fluctuations in revenue during
the next three years. See infra note 18.
14 For recent commentary on these issues, see Elliott, ConstitutionalConventions and
the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077; Gressman, Is the Item Veto Constitutional?,64 N.C.L. REV.
819 (1986); Note, The BalancedBudget Amendment: An Inquiry into Appropriateness,96 HARV.
L. REV. 1600 (1983); Comment, A ConstitutionalConvention: ScoutingArticle Five's Undiscovered Country, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 939 (1986). See also infra notes 84-86 and accompanying
text.
15 OMB & CBO, supra note 9, at 9 (table 5), reprintedin 51 Fed. Reg. at 1930; COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 9, app. C at 50-51, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. at 2862-63.
The COLAs may be reduced by less than 100% in certain circumstances, 2 U.S.C. §
901 (a)(3) (C) (ii) (II) (Supp. III 1985), but these circumstances did not arise in the computations for FY 1986 or 1987. The Act contains some exceptions, completely exempting
some accounts from reduction and providing special calculations for others. Id. §§ 905906.
16 See Statement by the President on the Supreme Court Decision, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 915 (July 7, 1986) (noting spending reductions authorized by sequestration order had "already been absorbed").
17 Act ofJuly 31, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-366, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(100 Stat.) 773.
18 The Budget Reconciliation Act, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, and
the Tax Reform Act produced, inter alia, the following combined effects: (a) the Budget
Reconciliation Act accelerated certain revenue collections into FY 1987 from FY 1988,
provided for "revenue" in FY 1987 from the sale of Conrail and certain governmentowned loans, and moved a payment under the expired revenue-sharing plan from FY
1987 back into FY 1986; (b) the Continuing Appropriations Resolution changed the
date of a military payday from Sept. 30, 1987 to Oct. 1, 1987, thereby transferring $2.9
billion of spending from FY 1987 to FY 1988; and (c) the Tax Reform Act's phase-in
provisions are projected to cause wide swings in revenue for the next three fiscal years.
The Budget Reconciliation Act also raised the debt ceiling by $189 billion to $2.3 trillion. Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 8201, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) -,
-.
The debt ceiling does not figure in the computation of the deficit, but is significant
because a debt increase enables the government to engage in deficit spending by using
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Achieving the Act's deficit reduction targets in future years will become increasingly difficult and will require deeper cuts by the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings ax.19
If the budget war heats up again, what guidance will Bowsher
provide? Did the Court withhold useful guidance on potential
budget issues in order to serve other judicial goals and values? In
discussing these questions, this article explores not only the issues
addressed by Bowsher, but also other issues that the Court could, and
arguably should, have addressed.
I
THE "EXECUTIVE"

NATURE OF THE COMPTROLLER

GENERAL'S FUNCTIONS

The Court characterized
under the primary triggering
lings as "executive." 20 The
Comptroller General's report
questration order. Such an
under two alternative theories

the Comptroller General's functions
mechanism of Gramm-Rudman-HolCourt apparently assumed that the
compels the President to issue a seassumption is highly questionable,
outlined below. If indeed the Comp-

newly borrowed money. See Statement on Signing H.R. 5300 into Law, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1421 (Oct. 21, 1986); Remarks on Signing H.R. 3838 into Law, 22
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1423 (Oct. 22, 1986); Statement by the President, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1496 (Oct. 30, 1986); Wehr, Gramm-Rudman Both Disappoints and Succeeds, 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2879 (1986).
19
The deficit targets under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings are $171.9 billion for FY
1986, $144 billion for FY 1987, $108 billion for FY 1988, $72 billion for FY 1989, $36
billion for FY 1990, and zero for FY 1991. 2 U.S.C. § 622(a)(7) (Supp. III 1985). Automatic spending cuts are triggered only if the projected deficit for a year is more than $10
billion above the targeted deficit amount for that year. Id. § 901(a).
According to former OMB Director David Stockman:
Gramm-Rudman will never reduce the nation's giant and dangerous
budget deficit by any significant amount. After one or two years, its
mechanical formula for across-the-board expenditure reductions in the
50 percent of the budget not exempted or protected would produce
havoc. The defense cuts would be so draconian as to amount to unilateral disarmament; a large portion of the IRS staff would be fired and we
would collect no revenue at all; life-saving new drug applications would
pile up at the Food and Drug Administration unreviewed; our airports
would become a parking lot for cars, people, and planes because the FAA
would be too short handed to manage even a fraction of a normal traffic.
All of this chaos and much, much more is inherent in the arithmetic
of Gramm-Rudman, and is the reason it will be eventually repealed or
drastically amended. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will spare us much
trouble by ruling it unconstitutional.

D.

STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS:

How THE

REAGAN REVOLUTION FAILED

392-93

(1986). Stockman proposes to "[tirim a little more spending where the democratic consensus will permit it, and raise a lot of new taxes to pay for the government the nation
has decided it wants." Id. at 394. On past budgetary conflicts between the legislative
and executive branches, see L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT 221-51 (1985).
20
Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3191-92.

1987]

BALANCING ACTS

531

troller General's report does not bind the President, the Comptroller General's residual functions under the Act may not be
"executive" in nature. Further, even if these functions are "executive," they may pass constitutional scrutiny if they do not interfere
excessively with the President's performance of his duties.
A.

Does the Comptroller General's Report Compel the
President to Issue a Sequestration Order?

Under either of two alternative interpretations of the GrammRudman-Hollings Act, the Comptroller General's report does not
force the President to issue a sequestration order. First, the Act can
be construed as authorizing the Comptroller General to direct,
rather than compel, the President to issue an order. Second,
although Congress may have intended that the Comptroller General's report bind the President, such a scheme is constitutionally
impermissible and therefore any order is the product of presidential
discretion.
1. Statute Is Directory, Not Mandatory
According to a basic principle of constitutional interpretation,
courts should preserve the constitutionality of a statute whenever
possible, even if this requires a strained interpretation of the statute. 21 One could thus read the statute as addressing the President
in directory, rather than mandatory, terms. 2 2 The text of GrammRudman-Hollings supports this interpretation in that the Act contains no enforcement mechanism to compel the President to issue a
sequestration order implementing the Comptroller General's
23
report.
21

Blitz v. Donovan, 740 F.2d 1241, 1244-46 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 2A C. SANDS, STAT-

UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.11 (4th ed. 1984).
22 2A C. SANDS, supra note 21, § 57.24; see French v. Edwards, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)

506, 511 (1871); Doe v. Brookline School Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 918 (Ist Cir. 1983);
Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 488-91 (5th Cir. 1977); cf. Train v. City of New York,
420 U.S. 35 (1975); infra note 83 and accompanying text (distinction between mandatory
and permissive appropriations).
23
The Act contains elaborate provisions for judicial review. 2 U.S.C. § 922 (Supp.
III 1985). Any member of Congress may seek declaratory and injunctive relief on the
ground that a presidential order of sequestration violates the Constitution or the Act. Id.
§ 922(a)(1), (3). Any member of Congress or any other adversely affected person may
seek declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the constitutionality of the Act. Id.
§ 922(a)(2).
If a court determines finally that a presidential sequestration order incorrectly
makes spending reductions, the President must revise the order within 20 days. Id.
§ 922(d)(1). If a final sequestration order does not make the reductions required by the
Act, and a court upholds finally the President on the basis of his constitutional powers,
the court must nullify the entire sequestration order for that year. Id. § 922(d)(2). Finally, if a court invalidates any of the procedures pertaining to the CBO, OMB, or
Comptroller General's reports, the OMB/CBO reports must be transmitted to a joint
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Interpreting the Act as directory, rather than mandatory, means
that the President upon receipt of the Comptroller General's report
has a choice: the President could issue a sequestration order according to the tenor of the Comptroller General's report, making the
order immediately effective without triggering the procedures of the
Impoundment Act of 1974;24 or the President could refuse to issue a
sequestration order while still carrying out deficit reduction by
sending a rescission message to Congress in accordance with the
25
Impoundment Act.

2.

President May Sever and DisregardMandatory Provision

Alternatively, one might agree with the Court that Congress unconstitutionally attempted to make the Comptroller General's report binding on the President but nevertheless conclude that the
President can disregard this unconstitutional feature of the Act.
Under this approach, the President, subject to judicial review, may
implement that portion of a statute he regards as constitutional,
while disregarding those provisions he regards as unconstitutional
and severable. President Reagan recently exemplified such an approach when he refused to conform to the Comptroller General's
actions under the Competition in Contracting Act of 198426 because
the President regarded the Act as unconstitutionally conferring executive powers upon the Comptroller General. 2 7 The President
persisted in his position until the courts validated the statute in
congressional committee which must report a joint resolution. Id. § 922(0. This final
provision is the "faIlback" procedure implemented after the Supreme Court's decision
in Bowsher.
None of the above provisions deals with the possibility that the President will issue
no sequestration order at all. Section 922(d)(2) only anticipates the possibility that a
court may hold the Act unconstitutional as an encroachment on the President's powers.
24
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act exempts presidential sequestration orders
from the Impoundment Act. Id. § 902(a)(1). The Impoundment Act of 1974 authorizes
the President to propose rescissions of budget authority for prior approval by Congress,
id. § 683 (1982), and to make deferrals, subject to disapproval by either House of Congress. Id. § 684. The deferral provision was held invalid in City of New Haven v. United
States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The New Haven court, relying on Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), noted the unconstitutionality of
the one-house veto contained in the deferral provision. 809 F.2d at 905. The court then
held the deferral provision invalid because the unconstitutional legislative veto could
not be severed from it. Id. at 905-09.
25
2 U.S.C. § 683 (1982).
26
31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (Supp. III 1985).
27 The President, asserting that the Act unconstitutionally authorized the Comptroller General to order a stay of the governmental procurement process, ordered federal agencies not to comply with certain actions taken by the Comptroller General under
the Act. See Statement on Signing H.R. 4170 into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1037 (July 18, 1984). A congressional committee stated, in response, that the President
violated the Constitution by ordering agencies not to comply with an Act of Congress.
See H.R. REP. No. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1985).

1987]

BALANCING ACTS

533

Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.2 8 Thus, the President could sever and disregard the provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act making the Comptroller General's report
mandatory, and treat the remainder of the Act as directory. Issuing
a sequestration order then becomes an exercise of presidential discretion in response to the nonbinding advice of the Comptroller
General.
B.

Are the Comptroller General's Residual Functions
"Executive"?

If the Comptroller General's report is not binding, the question
still remains whether his residual functions under Gramm-RudmanHollings properly can be characterized as "executive." These functions consist, in essence, of supplying the President with a draft sequestration order which, in the Comptroller General's opinion,
represents a valid implementation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act, and which therefore becomes effective when promulgated by
the President without the need to invoke the rescission procedures
of the Impoundment Act. Before preparing this draft, the Comptroller General must receive preliminary drafts from OMB and
CBO. 29 The Comptroller General must finalize his draft within a
tight timetable 30 and must submit this draft to Congress before the
President can implement it.31
This residual function of the Comptroller General may indeed
be "executive" in nature. If it is, however, many other functions
28
787 F.2d 875, aff'd on othergrounds on reheaing,809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986). In its
original decision, the Third Circuit concluded that the Comptroller General was not an
agent of the legislative branch and therefore no delegation problem existed. 787 F.2d at
885-87. On rehearing after Bowsher, the Third Circuit acknowledged the legislative
branch status of the Comptroller General and found no impermissible delegation or
interference in the executive branch's functions. 809 F.2d at 988-99.
2) The OMB and CBO reports to the Comptroller General are due August 20 for
the fiscal year that will start on October 1 of the same calendar year (but January 15,
1986 for FY 1986). 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985). The OMB and CBO revised
reports to the Comptroller General are due October 5 (but none for FY 1986). Id.
§ 901(c)(1).
30
The Comptroller General's report to Congress is due August 25 (butJanuary 20,
1986 for FY 1986). Id. § 901(b)(1). The Comptroller General's revised report to Congress is due October 10 (but none for FY 1986). Id. § 901(c)(2).
31
The President's initial sequestration order is due September I (but February 1,
1986 for FY 1986). Id. § 902(a)(1). The President's final sequestration order is due
October 15 (but none for FY 1986), id. § 902(b)(1), and becomes effective immediately.
Id. § 902(a)(6). (For FY 1986, the Act does not provide for a final order, and the initial
order becomes effective on March 1. Id. § 902(a)(6)(A).)
Congress may enact its own alternative measures to meet the deficit target. Id.
§ 904(b). The revised reports by CBO, OMB, and the Comptroller General must take
any such measures into account, id. § 901 (c), as must the President's final order of sequestration. Id. § 902(b)(2).
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performed by nonexecutive officers are also executive.3 2 Although
the Court's guidance on this issue would have been quite instructive, it regrettably offered little such guidance.
If the Court had concluded that the Comptroller General's
functions were not "executive," the Court would have had to explore other constitutional arguments asserted by the parties, particularly those focusing on the delegation doctrine. The Court
preferred, however, to render an express disclaimer of any opinion
33
on delegation.
C.

Do the Comptroller General's Functions Interfere
Excessively with the President's Functions?

Even if the Comptroller General's functions are characterized
as "executive," his performance of them may pass constitutional
scrutiny if it does not interfere excessively with the President's performance of his duties. Two post-Bowsher decisions rendered by
courts of appeals support this position.
In its post-Bowsher rehearing of Ameron,3 4 the Third Circuit upheld the powers conferred upon the Comptroller General by the
Competition in Contracting Act, including the power to order a
temporary stay in the procurement process. Even more recently, in
FTC v. American National Cellular, Inc.,35 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
statutory power of the Federal Trade Commission to bring suit to
enjoin false and deceptive trade practices. The court rejected the
challenger's argument that such suits may not be prosecuted by an
independent agency, but only by an agency within the executive
branch of government. Ameron and Cellular both support the view
that Congress may assign executive functions to officials not within
the executive branch, so long as performing these functions does
not interfere excessively with the exercise of presidential powers.
32
The Comptroller General has numerous other statutory functions, including the
power to stay the procurement process after receipt of bid protests. 31 U.S.C. § 3553
(Supp. III 1985); see also Ameron v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979
(3d Cir. 1986) (examining constitutionality of § 3553). The Comptroller General also
has power to settle all accounts of the United States, 31 U.S.C. § 3526 (1982), and to
settle all claims of or against the United States. Id. §§ 3702, 3711; see also Bowsher, 106 S.
Ct. at 3196-98 (Stevens, J., concurring) (listing other duties of Comptroller General).
Other governmental officials perform numerous types of functions that could be
characterized as "executive." See infra notes 43 & 45 (discussing issues that Supreme
Court chose not to address in Bowsher and their potential relevance to other agencies
and functions).
3 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3193 n.10.
34 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986); see supra note 28.
3_5 810 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (challenge to constitutionality of FTC's law enforcement powers dismissed; each judge of panel uses different rationale--exhaustion, ripeness, or lack of'
final agency action).
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The Ameron-Cellular approach contributes to the analysis of the
Comptroller General's functions under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. If the Comptroller General's report does not bind the
President but is merely advisory, the Comptroller General interferes
only minimally with the President's duties. Consequently, the
Comptroller General's function of issuing the report may pass constitutional scrutiny, even if this function is characterized as "executive" and the Comptroller General is characterized as a "nonexecutive" official.
By assuming that the Comptroller General's report binds the
President, the Bowsher Court failed to provide any guidance for
lower courts regarding the permissible limits of "executive" action
by "nonexecutive" officials. The Court's guidance would have gone
far to clarify the status and powers of the "independent" agencies,
matters that the Court chose instead to leave in a state of continuing
uncertainty.
II
REMOVABILITY OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

Having characterized the Comptroller General's function as
"executive" under the primary triggering mechanism, the Court
concluded that Congress cannot properly assign this function to the
Comptroller General because he is subject to removal by Congress. 36, Even assuming that the Comptroller General has executive
duties under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the Court's analysis of the
Comptroller General's removability is troublesome.
A.

Does the Risk of Removal Affect Performance of Official
Duties?

The Bowsher Court assumed that public officials likely perform
their duties in a manner that minimizes the risk of removal from
office. 3 7 Although this may be a reasonable generalization, many
public officials prefer to stand by their professional judgments even
36

Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3191-92. The Court observed that the Comptroller Gen-

eral "may be removed not only by impeachment but also by Joint Resolution of Congress 'at any time' resting on any one of the following bases: '(i) permanent disability;
(ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony or conduct involving
moral turpitude.'" Id. at 3189 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) (1982)). A footnote adds:
Although the President could veto such a joint resolution, the veto
could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress.
Thus, the Comptroller General could be removed in the face of Presidential opposition. Like the District Court, 626 F. Supp., at 1393 n.21, we
therefore read the removal provision as authorizing removal by Congress

alone.
Id. at 3l189 n.7.
:17 Id. al 3188.

536

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:527

though they risk removal from office.a 8 Any generalization about
public officials' trying to keep their jobs is, in any event, a flimsy
foundation on which to invalidate a statute.
The Court should have inquired instead whether the removal
provision will significantly influence the Comptroller General when
he drafts the report required by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.
The issue would be whether the percentage of spending cuts proposed in the Comptroller General's report would likely change if the
removal provision were different.
One way to address the removal issue is to ask the Comptroller
General and the people who wield the power of removal. In their
Bowsher briefs and oral argument, the Comptroller General and the
congressional leadership insisted that the Comptroller General was
not subservient to Congress and would exercise his professional
judgment regardless of the risk of removal from office. 3 9 The Solicitor General, on behalf of the executive departments of the United
States, urged the contrary as did a small number of members of
40
Congress and the private parties.

Notably, no Congress has even so much as threatened removal
of the Comptroller General since the enactment of the removal provision in 192 1.4 1 Furthermore, any attempt by Congress to remove
38
Indeed, some officials may even invite removal, hoping to reap rewards in subsequent private-sector employment or in the literary arena.
39 Brief for Appellant Comptroller General of the United States at 22-33, Bowsher,
106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (No. 85-1377); Brief of Appellant United States Senate at 18-25,
Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (No. 85-1377); Brief of the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group at 43-49, Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (No. 85-1377) (noting that "the
Comptroller General submitted to the district court a thorough affidavit describing how
he performed his function which amply demonstrated the absence of Congressional in-

fluence"); see also Arguments Before the Court, supra note 4, at 3709-10.

The independence of Charles A. Bowsher, who served as Comptroller General during the litigation and continues in office, is demonstrated in his background. He is a
certified public accountant (CPA) and before entering governmental service practiced as
a partner in the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen & Co. See 1 WHO's WHO IN
AMERICA, 1986-1987, at 307 (44th ed. 1986) (listing of "Bowsher, Charles Arthur").
The Supreme Court recently acknowledged the high degree of professional independence of practicing CPAs vis-A-vis their clients. United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984). As a CPA in governmental service, Bowsher arguably is
even more independent than if he were in private practice, especially because he could
significantly increase his income if he returned to private practice after removal as
Comptroller General. In contrast, the Oregon postmaster whose discharge from governmental employment was at issue in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), may
have been unable to obtain comparable employment elsewhere.
40
The appellees did not allege subservient behavior by the Comptroller General.
Instead, they argued that he is subservient as a matter of law. Brief for the United States
at 33, Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (No. 85-1377); Brief of Appellees, Mike Synar.
Member of Congress, et al. at 47-48, Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (No. 85-1377); Brief
fbr Appellee National Treasury Employees Union at 37-43, Bousher, 106 S. Ct. 3181
(1986) (No. 85-1377); see also Arguments Before the Court, supra note 4, at 3709-10.
41 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3213 (White, J., dissenting).
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the Comptroller General on policy grounds would probably fail because the statutory grounds for removal do not include disagreements over policy. 4 2 Thus, exercising his duties under GrammRudman-Hollings appears to place the Comptroller General under
no serious threat of removal from office.
In addition, the Comptroller General has limited discretion
under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. He receives drafts from CBO and
OMB, prepares his own report within a few days, and submits it to
Congress before the President issues a sequestration order.
Although the Comptroller General undoubtedly exercises some discretion, it is so severely circumscribed that it affords him little, if
any, opportunity to curry favor with Congress or anyone else.
B.

Alternative Remedy-"De Facto" Executive Officer
Removable by President

The Court's remedy-invalidating the primary triggering mechanism of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings-is questionable even if one accepts the Court's conclusions that the Act confers an "executive"
function upon the Comptroller General, and that the threat of removal from office will influence the Comptroller General's decisions. Instead the Court could have upheld the statute by ruling
that the exercise of "executive" power assigned by the Act rendered
the Comptroller General a "de facto" executive officer, subject to
43
removal by the President.
The concept of a "de facto" executive officer would require reexamination of the President's removal power under Humphrey's
Executor v. United States 44 and Wiener v. United States.45 This reexamiId. at 3211; see also supra note 36 (quoting statutory grounds for removal).
43 The Solicitor General advanced a similar theory but urged a different conclusion.
He argued that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act is unconstitutional because, among
other reasons, it confers upon the Comptroller General functions that "may be performed only by the President or by an Officer of the United States serving at the pleasure of the President." Brief for the United States, supra note 40, at 44. Justice White, in
his Bowsher dissent, pointed out that the Court rejected this argument. 106 S. Ct. at
3206 (White, J., dissenting); see also hfra note 45.
44 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
45 357 U.S. 349 (1958). Wiener, like Hunphrev's Executor, indicates that Congress
may protect an officer from policy-based presidential removal if that officer performs
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions. Apparently, Congress can also delegate
some legislative power to private individuals and insulate those individuals from either
congressional control under the senatorial advice and consent power, or executive control under the appointment power. Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp.
510, 519-524 (D.D.C. 1986) (deciding that Reserve Bank members of Federal Open
Market Committee, elected by Reserve Bank board of directors, are private individuals
exercising delegated legislative power). Even if Humiphrey 's Executor and Wiener retain
their vitality, they do not protect an officer from policy-based presidential removal if that
officer performs executive (or quasi-executive) functions. This conclusion seems consistent with Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (President has unrestricted removal
42
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nation would be a natural sequel to INS v. Chadha46 and its companion cases 4 7 which cast considerable doubt on the independence of
the so-called independent agencies. 48 The inquiry would also permit the Court to clarify the question-only partly resolved in
Ameron 49 -regarding the validity of the Comptroller General's powers under the Competition in Contracting Act. The district court in
Synar referred briefly to Chadha5 ° and Ameron, 5 1 but the Supreme
Court did not continue this line of analysis in its Bowsher opinion.
Had the Court decided that the Comptroller General was a "de
power over executive officers), and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (President
has absolute immunity from civil liability for removing personnel in executive branch).
Distinguishing between executive (or quasi-executive) functions on the one hand
and quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions on the other is an exercise in line drawing. It ultimately leads to a functional analysis and reconsideration of presidential and
congressional control over the "independent" agencies. The district court in Synar recognized the problem, 626 F. Supp. at 1398-1400, and the Solicitor General offered some
analysis of the problem in his Supreme Court brief. Brief for the United States, supra
note 40, at 44-5 1. During oral argument in the district court and in the Supreme Court,
the bench posed questions regarding the potential impact of this case on the Federal
Reserve Board. Brief of the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group, supra note 39, at
13 (referring to argument in district court); Arguments Before the Court, supra note 4, at
3710. Evidently the Supreme Court hesitated to embark on this analytical exercise in
Bowsher or to reconsider existing case law on the removability of officers.
The majority opinion in Bowsher mentioned the possibility of invalidating the 1921
statutory removal provision but noted the complex ramifications that would follow such
a declaration. Instead, the Court left the 1921 statute intact and invalidated that portion
of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act empowering the Comptroller General to trigger
the cuts in spending, thereby invoking the fallback provision. 106 S.Ct. at 3192-93.
The Court thus rejected Ameron, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986), and followed the approach
taken in Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and its companion cases of slowly squeezing the
independent agencies without pronouncing the complete termination of their independence. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
Justice Blackmun argued in his Bowsher dissent that any incompatibility between the
Comptroller General's functions under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the removal provisions of the 1921 statute "should be cured by refusing to allow congressional removal-if it ever is attempted-and not by striking down the central provisions of the
Deficit Control Act." 106 S.Ct. at 3215 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
46 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
47
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S.
1216 (1983) (affirming D.C. Circuit's invalidation of one-House veto provision of Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978); United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (affirming D.C. Circuit's invalidation of two-House veto provision of Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1980).
48
The district court in Synar observed that "some of the language.., in Chadha
does not lie comfortably beside the central revelation of Humphrey's Executor that an officer such as a Federal Trade Commissioner 'occupies no place in the executive department.' " 626 F. Supp. at 1399 (quoting Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 628); see also id.
at 1398 (citing Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 Coi.tTM. L. REv. 573, 633-40 (1984)).
41)

787 F.2d 875, aff'd on other grounds on rehearing, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986): see

supra note 28.
5()
626 F. Supp. at 1399.

51

Id. at 1399 n.29.
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facto" executive officer removable by the President, it would then
have had to face the delegation issue, namely, whether Gramm-Rudman-Hollings delegated excessive authority to the President or to
an official removable by the President.
III
DELEGATION AT THE MACRO- AND MICROLEVELS

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings delegates power at two levels-the
macrolevel and the microlevel. At the macrolevel, the Act delegates
the power to compute the across-the-board percentage spending cut
needed to meet the targeted deficit amount. 5 2 The microlevel delegation authorizes the agency heads, subject to presidential control,
to implement detailed spending cuts after the President issues a sequestration order or Congress enacts a joint resolution requiring
53
the cut.
The district court in Synar sustained the validity of the
macrolevel delegation in the Act, 54 but did not even mention the
microlevel delegation. The Supreme Court, after disposing of the
case on other grounds, expressly declined to decide the delegation
issue. 5 5 Arguably, the courts should have clarified both the macro52 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 54, 66 & 68.
54 626 F. Supp. at 1382-91. In a footnote, the court observed: "Plaintiffs do not
challenge the procedure by which the administrators are to allocate the spending reductions necessary to reduce the deficit excess." Id. at 1387 n.11. In context, this footnote
meant only that the plaintiffs did not challenge the specific allocations contained in the
pre-sequestration reports prepared by CBO, OMB, and the Comptroller General. The
footnote did not address the method by which the President decided to reduce spending
for specific items after issuing the sequestration order. Indeed, the court had no means
of knowing what specific spending cuts the President intended to make, because the
President issued his sequestration order on February 1, 1986, to become effective on
March 1, and the district court rendered its decision on February 7, apparently without
any post-argument submissions from the parties. The President's sequestration order
incorporated by reference the CBO, OMB, and Comptroller General reports without
adding further detail. Only later did the President, acting through OMB and the agency
heads, execute the spending cuts. See supra note 16; infra note 66.
CongressmanJack Brooks asserted that the Act is "a wholesale abdication of constitutional responsibility by the elected officials of our federal government." Brooks,
Granin-Rudnian:Can Congress and the PresidentPass This Buck?, 64 TEx. L. REV. 131 (dated
1985, but published in 1986 after Supreme Court had noted probable jurisdiction to
review district court's decision in Svnar). Congressman Brooks and other congressional
opponents of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act joined in the amicus curiae brief filed in
the Supreme Court in Bowsher by Congressman William H. Gray III. Brief Amicus Curiae of William H. Gray III el al., Members of Congress, Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986)
(No. 85-1377). Although Congressmen Brooks and Gray focused on the Act's delegation at the macrolevel, their arguments support my criticism of the Act at the microlevel.
See infra text accompanying note 68.
55 106 S. Ct. at 3193 n.10.
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and microlevel delegation issues that were presented by Bowsher and
are likely to recur.
A.

Delegation at the Macrolevel

After a careful analysis of precedent, the district court in Synar
concluded that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings delegates an acceptable
amount of macrolevel discretion to the Comptroller General. The
court, however, held the primary triggering provision unconstitutional because it conferred "executive" functions upon an official
56
removable by Congress.
In finding the Act's macrolevel delegation constitutionally permissible, the district court's conclusion appears sound. The Act
provides elaborate instructions for the macrocomputation; it requires drafts from both the CBO and the OMB; it requires the
Comptroller General to submit his draft to Congress; and it empowers Congress to revise the budget as it sees fit, so long as the deficit
reduction target is met, thereby rendering the entire sequestration
process unnecessary. 5 7 Finally, Congress retains its ultimate authority to override the Comptroller General, the President, or even the
entire Gramm-Rudman-Hollings system by enacting new legislation.
The macrolevel delegation to the Comptroller General appears
no more offensive than the power delegated by other statutes to
other agencies. The Supreme Court's reluctance to address the delegation issue is, however, understandable. The Court may prefer to
leave the delegation doctrine unsettled until some basic questions
regarding the status of the independent agencies are resolved. 58 If,
for example, the Court determines that "de facto" executive officers
are removable by and answerable to the President, even when
housed in "independent" agencies, then the Court, relying on presidential supervision of officers, may allow even broader delegations
than existing case law tolerates. The Court may want to avoid confronting the delegation issue in connection with across-the-board
spending cuts because of concern that its words may be used in future debates about the validity of automatic income tax increases as
59
a deficit reduction device.
B.

Delegation at the Microlevel

The district court did not address the issue of delegation at the
microlevel, arguably because of doubts about which plaintiffs had
standing. The district court reluctantly conceded that prevailing
56
57
58
5)

626 F. Supp. at 1403.
See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45 & 48 and accompanying text.
See i'fra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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District of Columbia Circuit case law granted standing to the congressional plaintiffs, but recognized without question the standing
of the private plaintiffs because the sequestration order deprived
them of COLAs to which they were otherwise entitled. 60 The
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act requires total elimination of these
6
COLAs before applying percentage reductions to other items. '
Thus, only the macrocomputation, not the microcomputation applying the across-the-board spending cuts, injured the private
plaintiffs.
The appropriations process itself confers broad discretion upon
the executive at the microlevel of specific spending decisions. This
discretion depends on the amount of detail in each "line" of the
appropriations bill, 6 2 and on technical interpretations of terms used
in preparing and executing budgets, such as "apportionment," "account," "program," "project," and "activity." 63 The detail in an appropriations act depends largely on the detail in the President's
budget proposal, which in turn depends on the detail in budgets
furnished to OMB by each agency.6 4 Once Congress enacts an appropriations statute, the President is responsible for executing it.
An essential step is the "apportionment" of each line of the appropriations act among the relevant time periods and functional
subdivisions.65
626 F. Supp. at 1380-82.
61 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(3)(C) (Supp. III 1985); see supra note 15.
62 In practice, the amount of detail in each line of an appropriations bill varies. The
first Congress enacted appropriations acts with very little detail. Act of Sept. 29, 1789,
ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 104; Act of Feb. 11, 1791, ch. 6, 1
Stat. 190. More detail appeared in the appropriations acts enacted by the second Congress. Act of Dec. 23, 1791, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 226; Act of Feb. 25, 1793, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 325;
see L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 59-74 (1975); Abascal & Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and ConstitutionalFranework, 62 GEO. LJ. 1549,
1578-83 (1974).
In Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1937), the Court
upheld the power of Congress to appropriate funds in a lump sum rather than in detail,
at least in the context of that case, where a tax on the processing of coconut oil from the
Philippines was given back to the Philippine treasury without spending restrictions. No
case, however, expressly authorizes an appropriations act consisting of one line covering
all the government's spending for the year. Evidently, control over the amount of detail
in an appropriations act is primarily political rather than judicial.
63
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act defines "account" as "an item for which appropriations are made in any appropriation Act used to determine the budget base." 2
U.S.C. § 907(8) (Supp. III 1985). Thus, each line in the appropriations act represents an
"account." After enactment, OMB makes a series of decisions about the specific "programs," "projects," and "activities" that comprise each "account." See infra notes 66-67
and accompanying text.
64 See OMB CIRCULAR No. A-i1, PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION OF BUDGET EsnMATES (1986) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
65 31 U.S.C. §§ 1511-1519 (1982); see OMB CIRCULAR No. A-34, INSTRUCTIONS ON
BUDGET EXECUTION (1985) (on file at CornellLaw Review). On the use and abuse of presidential discretion in executing appropriations, see L. FISHER, supra note 62, at 75-146.
60
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Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, whether triggered by presidential
sequestration order or by joint resolution of Congress, confers additional microlevel discretion. After completely eliminating COLAs,
the Act requires across-the-board percentage cuts in each
nondefense "account" 6 6 and in each defense "program, project or
66 Across-the-board cuts are made after giving effect to exemptions and special
computations in the case of some accounts. See supra note 15.
The Supreme Court in Bowsher apparently believed that CBO, OMB, and the Comptroller General must calculate all cuts on a program-by-program basis, and that the President must sequester on the same program-by-program basis. 106 S.Ct. at 3184, 3192.
In fact, the reports and the President's sequestration order for FY 1986 used accounts as
the units for determining reductions in nondefense spending, rather than subdividing
these nondefense accounts into programs, projects, or activities. See OMB & CBO, supra
note 9, at 19, reprintedin 51 Fed. Reg. at 1940; COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 9, app.
A at 6, 19, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. at 2818, 2831; Sequestration Order, supra note 9, at
4291. Consequently, allocation of the spending cuts to each account's programs,
projects, or activities occurred after the President issued the sequestration order. See
supra note 54.
The Comptroller General's report makes this clear by stating that "neither the
OMB/CBO report nor the report of the Comptroller General is required to adjust programs, projects, or activities within accounts in non-defense programs." COMPTROLLER
GENERAL, supra note 9, app. A at 5, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. at 2817. Similarly,
OMB/CBO's report for FY 1987 shows nondefense spending by "account" without subdivision into programs, projects, and activities. OMB & CBO, supra note 11, app., reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. at 29,857-99.
I find the Comptroller General's interpretation of the Act more persuasive than the
Court's. The Act requires the OMB/CBO report to specify the proposed reductions in
spending "by account, for non-defense programs, and by account and programs,
projects, and activities within each account, for defense programs." 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2)
(Supp. III 1985). The Act uses consistent language in other provisions regarding the
OMB/CBO report, id. § 901 (a) (3) (B), (a)(4) (C) (i)-(ii), and the Comptroller General's report. Id. § 901(b)(1), (d)(2).
The President's initial sequestration order must specify the reductions in spending
"from each affected program, project, and activity .... applying the same reduction
percentage as the percentage by which the account involved is reduced in the [Comp-

troller General's] report submitted under section 901(b) . . . , or'from each affected budget

account ifthe program, project, or activity is not so setforth." Id. § 902(a)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis
added). This requirement is subject to exceptions, id. § 902(a)(2), giving the President
special flexibility to reduce defense spending for FY 1986.
If the Comptroller General's report does not show any detail regarding programs,
projects, or activities included within nondefense accounts, then neither will the President's sequestration order. However, the Comptroller General's report cannot show
these details unless the OMB/CBO reports include them. Therefore, by exercising its
statutory right to omit this detail from its report, OMB can prevent the Comptroller
General from including it in his report, thus allowing the President to omit from the
sequestration order any detail about cuts in programs, projects, or activities within
nondefense accounts. This analysis is consistent with other provisions of the Act. See id.
§ 902(a)(3), (a)(5)(A), (b)(1)(C).
Nonetheless, the President is prohibited from "eliminating any program, project, or
activity of the Federal Government." Id. § 902(d). This provision implies that the President may impose disproportionate cuts in certain programs so long as each program,
project, and activity is preserved at or above a minimal level. Other provisions may raise
additional questions. See id. § 902(a)(6)(D)(i)(II) (for FY 1986 only, congressional appropriations committees may define "program, project, and activity"); id. § 906(b) (special treatment of federal administrative expenses); id. § 922(d)(1)(B) (enforcement

BALANCING ACTS

1987]

543

activity." 67 The nondefense "accounts" which are subject to reduction under the Act are the same units found in the President's
budget proposals and in the appropriations acts. In a formal sense,
therefore, the across-the-board cuts have as much detail as appears
in an appropriations act, although the elaborate documentation and
committee work typically clarifying the legislative intent of an appropriations act does not accompany the spending cuts.
In a practical sense, however, a standard percentage cut in all
"accounts" produces varying and sometimes unpredictable consequences because the mix between administrative and service costs
varies, and because some programs need a minimal dollar amount
even to exist. 68 As the overall macrolevel percentage cut increases,
the consequences of that cut at the microlevel become increasingly
volatile. For example, a 60% across-the-board cut would create
more uneven results at the microlevel, and would therefore pose
much greater delegation problems than did the 4.3% cut in
nondefense accounts for FY 1986 involved in Bowsher. Perhaps
Congress delegates excessive, and therefore unconstitutional,
microlevel discretion when the percentage cut becomes so large that
Congress cannot reasonably anticipate the consequences at the
microlevel.
Additional discretion arises because the estimates providing the
basis for the macrolevel cuts at the beginning of the fiscal year almost certainly need revision in light of actual events and updated
projections during the year.6 9 Eliminating the resulting discrepancy
mechanism available if President sequesters incorrect amount "with respect to any program, project, activity, or account"). Read in context, these provisions may mean only
that the President is bound by the amount of detail contained in the Comptroller General's report, so long as the President does not completely eliminate any program.
67 Id. § 901(a)(2), (a)(3)(B), (b)(1), (c) (4) (C) (i), (d)(2). Defense and nondefense accounts receive different treatment, perhaps because defense accounts are usually much

larger than nondefense accounts. Therefore Congress has greater need for the breakdown of a defense account into its constituent programs, projects, and activities.

68

Two of the Bowsher briefs discussed the impact of microlevel spending cuts. Brief

of Amicus Curiae Edward Blankstein at 7-9, 21-23, Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (No.
85-1377); Brief for Amici Curiae Coalition for Health Funding, et al. at 17-19, Bowsher,
106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (No. 85-1377). The General Accounting Office has also issued
reports on implementation of the spending cuts. IMPLEMENTING FY 1986 REDUCTIONS:
BALANCED BUDGET AND EMERGENCY DEFICIT CONTROL ACT OF 1985 (1986) (on file at

Cornell Law Review);

TRAINING BUDGETS: AGENCY BUDGET REDUCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO

THE BALANCED BUDGET ACT (1986) (on file at Cornell Law Review); BUDGET ISSUES: LIMITATIONS ON ANALYZING THE COST OF ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS (1986) (on file at
nell Law Review); FY 1986 BUDGET SEQUESTRATION: AGENCY APPROACHES
IMPLEMENTING REDUCTIONS UNDER FORMULA GRANTS (1986) (on file at Cornell

CorTO

Law

Review).
69 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings requires the first OMB/CBO report to use the prior
year's appropriations, unless Congress has already enacted appropriations for the year
covered by the report. 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(6)(B) (Supp. III 1985). The revised
OMB/CBO report must reflect the impact of any legislation enacted after preparation of
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between the spending cuts projected by the macrodecision and the
actual microlevel reductions resulting from applying this percentage
cut is largely the responsibility of the executive, subject to congres7°
sional controls of varying effectiveness.
Congress has established mechanisms for controlling the President's exercise of discretion in executing appropriations acts. The
crux of these mechanisms is the Comptroller General's power, established in the 1921 statute 7 t and elaborated in the Impoundment
Act of 197472 and in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985, 7 3 to
examine the government's accounts, to report any irregularities to
Congress, and, in some circumstances, to bring suit seeking the
President's compliance with statutory requirements.
IV
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

The fallback provision in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings provides
for congressional action by joint resolution, under streamlined procedures and with limited time for floor debate. 74 Arguably, the appropriate legislative vehicle under these circumstances is a statute
rather than a joint resolution with its abbreviated procedures. The
Supreme Court did not address this issue in Bowsher, although it im75
pliedly approved of the fallback process.
The Constitution requires that appropriations be "made by
Law." ' 76 Because the spending cuts are, in effect, negative appropriations, they should also be made only by "Law." In many ways, a
the first report. Id. § 901(c)(1). The OMB/CBO FY 1987 Initial Report was based on
the previous year's level of appropriations. OMB & CBO, supra note 11, at 2, reprinted in
51 Fed. Reg. at 29,832.
70
Any item sequestered under a presidential order is permanently cancelled. 2
U.S.C. § 906(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985). Apparently, then, if the cuts produce a surplus
because they were greater than necessary to meet the statutory target, only new legislation can appropriate this surplus. If the deficit worsens, the President may seek rescissions under the Impoundment Act. See supra note 24. Although Gramm-RudmanHollings requires the Comptroller General to report by November 15 on the extent to
which the President's sequestration order complies with the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 903 (Supp.
III 1985), it establishes no mechanism for monitoring any economic conditions or variations between actual and projected revenues and spending.
Congress displayed an opportunistic approach toward changing conditions when in
October 1986 it transferred some spending from FY 1987 back into already-expired FY
1986, in order to achieve the target for FY 1987. See supra note 18.
71
31 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3544 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
72 2 U.S.C. §§ 686-687 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
73
2 U.S.C. § 903 (Supp. III 1985).
74 Id. § 922(0. The Impoundment Act of 1974, id. § 688 (1982), provides legislative precedent for such streamlined congressional procedures, but the Gramm-RudmanHollings procedures are considerably more abbreviated.
75 See supra text accompanying note 7.
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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joint resolution is equivalent to a statute; for example, each requires
presentation to the President for approval or veto. 77 Courts have
consistently held that the legal effect of ajoint resolution is identical
s
to that of an enacted bill.y
The congressional rules of procedure for adopting ajoint resolution are the same as those for enacting a bill. 7 9 The legislative tradition, however, is different. Expedited procedures usually govern
the adoption of joint resolutions.8 0 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
builds upon this tradition by providing special streamlined procedures, including limited time for debate on joint resolutions imple8
menting spending cuts under the fallback provision. '
Even if implementing the fallback provision by some type of
joint resolution is valid, arguably the streamlined process in
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is unacceptable because it does not give
Congress the same opportunity for deliberation that was available
when the funds were initially appropriated. For example, the
streamlined joint resolution procedure might prevent any significant
congressional examination of the microeffects of a proposed
macrocut in spending.
Although each House of Congress may adopt new rules by simple majority at the beginning of a session, waiver or suspension of
the rules during a session requires a special majority. Accordingly, a
closely divided Congress could vote to implement the fallback provision without being able to extend debate beyond the limits stated
in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Confined by these limits, Congress
probably could not express any legislative intent to guide the Executive's discretion in applying the macrocut at the microlevel. The resulting joint resolution would be subject to serious constitutional
82
question as a standardless delegation.
77 Id., § 7, cl. 3. The Bowsher Court recognized this requirement in its discussion of
the Comptroller General's removal by joint resolution under the 1921 statutory provision. 106 S. Ct. at 3189-90 & 3189 n.7.
78 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Levey v. Stockslager, 129 U.S. 470, 475 (1889);
United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1234-35 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1947 (1986); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Washington Terminal Co., 473 F.2d
1156, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 906 (1973).
79

4 A. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

UNITED STATES

§§ 3370-3375 (1907).

80 According to congressional aides, joint resolutions are more likely to be
processed under waivers of the rules or under the most informal procedures available.
81 2 U.S.C. § 922(0(4) (Supp. III 1985) limits the debate to two hours in each
House and applies the limiting procedures of id. § 904(a) (4) to any action taken in either
House.
82 The joint resolution enacted under the fallback provision in July 1986 is subject
to challenge on these grounds, but that action is probably valid because FY 1986 was
almost over, the microimpact of the cuts was reasonably well understood at the time, the
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V
DEALING WITH FUTURE BUDGET ISSUES: SOME
HYPOTHETICALS

The following examples illustrate the broad range ofjusticiable
cuts were already absorbed, and therefore Congress was not delegating any significant
power to the President to engage in future cuts.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 empowers each House to determine its own procedural
rules. By tradition, one Congress cannot impose procedures upon its successors, either
by statute or by procedural rule. See 5 A. HINDS, supra note 79, §§ 6744-6747, 67656768; Brooks, supra note 54, at 138. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act expressly preserves the power of each House to make and change its own rules. Pub. L. No. 99-177,
§ 271(c), 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 1037, 1094 (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 901 note (Supp. III 1985) (exercise of congressional rulemaking power)). I
believe section 271(c) incorporates the requirements contained in the rules of each
House for special majorities to waive or suspend the rules. See House of Representatives
Rule 27(1) (suspension of rules requires two-thirds vote; motion to suspend only entertained on Mondays, Tuesdays, and last six days of session), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 925 (M. Wormser 3d ed. 1982); Senate Rule 5 (waiver
of rules requires unanimous consent unless upon one day's written notice), reprinted in
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra, at 944.
The Act allows the first OMB/CBO report, due August 20, to be based on the prior
year's appropriations if Congress has not already enacted appropriations for the coming
year. See supra notes 29 & 69. If Congress operates within the statutory timetable, however, the House will complete action on annual appropriations bills byJune 30, 2 U.S.C.
§ 631 (Supp. III 1985), and the Senate and the President can then meet the August 20
due date of the OMB/CBO report. Thus the Act recognizes and even anticipates that
Congress may fail to act within its own statutory timetable. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that Congress may take legislative action in violation of its own procedural rules.
In fact, Congress failed to comply with this timetable for FY 1987 and instead enacted a series of short-term continuing appropriations until it completed work on continuing appropriations for the entire fiscal year on October 17, 1986. One such
continuing resolution, Pub. L. No. 99-491, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100
Stat.) 1239, expired and government workers were sent home because the government
had run out of money for their salaries. Calmes, The 99th Congress: A Mixed Record of
Success, 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2647, 2651 (1986). For the President's position on
Congress's failed attempt to pass a FY 1987 budget, see Radio Address to the Nation, 22
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1287 (Sept. 27, 1986) (chiding Congress for not meeting
appropriations deadline); Message to the House of Representatives Returning HJ. Res.
748 Without Approval, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1365 (Oct. 9, 1986) (in course of
vetoing resolution because of its provision for rehiring fired air traffic controllers, noting
time for congressional action on budget "long past due"); Statement upon Signing HJ.
Res. 751 into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1372 (Oct. 11, 1986) (referring to
failure of Congress to "do its duty" as being "inefficient, disruptive, and costly-in a
word, it is a disgrace").
The inability of one Congress to bind its successors applies not only to procedural
matters, but also to the substance of legislation. See Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185 (1986); Young, Some
Reflections on Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 45 MD. L. REV. 1 (1986). Congress has enacted
statutes requiring balanced budgets and subsequently ignored them. See 41 CONG.
ALMANAC: 99TH CONG., 1ST SESs. 460 (1985) (citing balanced budget requirements of
Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-435, § 7, 92 Stat. 1051, 1053 (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 27 (Supp. V 1981), restated in Act of Oct. 7, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-389, § 3, 94 Stat.
1551, 1553 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982))).
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issues that could arise in a future unfolding budgetary nightmare.
In each case, I assume the existence of hypothetical statutes, enacted in response to ever-increasing budgetary crises.
A.

Case One

In contrast to past practice, congressional appropriations acts
divide the total appropriated amount into fewer lines, each representing a larger number of items.
Comment. This allows the President more microlevel discretion
in executing each "line" of the appropriations act. Thus the delegation issue is at stake here. At the same time, using larger, more inclusive lines in the appropriations act forces the President to think
more carefully before exercising the line-item veto (discussed below
in case three), because the veto affects everything included in a particular line.
B.

Case Two

Congress provides insufficient revenues to cover the total
amount of all appropriations, but makes all appropriations
mandatory rather than making some mandatory and others
permissive.
Comment. In Train v. City of New York 8 3 the Supreme Court held
that by using mandatory language in an appropriations act, Congress can compel the President to spend the appropriated funds. In
Train, Congress designated some of its appropriations as mandatory
and others as permissive, but allowed only enough resources for the
mandatory appropriations and a portion of the permissive ones. In
order to ensure that total spending would not exceed available resources, President Nixon reduced the amount spent on some programs covered by mandatory appropriations and some covered by
permissive appropriations. The Train Court did not speculate on the
President's discretion to spend less than the full amount of permissive appropriations, or on the President's duty if Congress's
mandatory appropriations exceed the available resources.
The hypothetical situation in case two illustrates the latter issue.
By enacting mandatory appropriations beyond the level of available
resources, Congress compels the President to reduce spending in
some of the programs, but gives no indication as to which programs
83 420 U.S. 35 (1975). The distinction between mandatory and permissive appropriations, an essential predicate of the Train Court's decision, is echoed in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. The Act states that the President may not alter the relative budget
priorities established by Congress. 2 U.S.C. § 902(e) (Supp. III 1985). Thus, Congress
claims continuing power to assign higher priority to some spending categories
(mandatory) than to others (permissive).
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he should cut, because all appropriations carry the top-priority
designation of "mandatory." Absent congressional guidance, the
President, in his sole discretion, must make the needed spending
cuts. Congress thus abdicates its own responsibility by delegating
excessive authority to the Executive.
C.

Case Three

The President exercises a line-item veto pursuant to statute.
Comment. President Reagan has recommended as one remedy
for the budget crisis a constitutional amendment granting the President the power to veto lines in an appropriations act.8 4 Most state
constitutions provide for a line-item veto by the Governor, and a
few go even further by allowing the Governor either to eliminate or
to reduce any line.8 5 Some members of Congress suggest that if a
constitutional amendment establishing the line-item veto is politically unfeasible then Congress should create a line-item veto by statute. They reason that the statutory veto would be merely a condition
attached to appropriations. But any such statutory attempt to authorize a line-item veto raises the issues of the delegation of power
to the President, of the basic powers of the President, and of the
absence of any mention of a line-item veto in the text of the
Constitution.8 6
D.

Case Four

The remaining hypotheticals represent the cumulative stages of
case four with each stage further exacerbating the budgetary crisis.
1. Stage A
The Comptroller General, now removable under statute either
by joint resolution or by the President, projects an enormous deficit
for the coming year and orders the President to make across-theboard spending cuts at the rate of 50%, the maximum allowed by
the statute, in each line of the appropriations act.
Comment. The constitutional questions here are whether the
Comptroller General can, by statute, be removable both by Con84 President Reagan enjoyed a similar power while Governor of California. He
noted that as Governor of California he exercised the line-item veto 943 times in eight
years, without once being overridden. Remarks at a Meeting with State Chairpersons,
National White House Conference on Small Business, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1101, 1102 (Aug. 15, 1986).
85 See tabulation in 26 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES
111-13 (1986) and GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET ISSUES: STATE BALANCED
BUDGET PRACTICES (1985) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
86 Cf Gressman, supra note 14 (questioning constitutionality of statute granting
President line-item veto power).
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gress and by the President, whether the Comptroller General (if so
removable) can compel the President to issue a sequestration order,
and whether the 50% spending cut is inherently unconstitutional
because Congress cannot reasonably foresee such a cut's impact on
specific spending at the microlevel.
2.

Stage B

The Treasury determines that even with the 50% spending cut
ordered by the Comptroller General in stage A, a 20% income tax
increase is needed to reach the deficit reduction target. The Treasury accordingly imposes the tax increase, as allowed by statute in
such situations.
Comment. A statute authorizing the Executive to impose an automatic income tax increase raises a distinctive problem under the
delegation doctrine. Although Congress may delegate to the President the power to alter tariffs without further Congressional action, 8 7 more recent case law indicates that Congress's ability to
delegate the power to tax may be more limited than its ability to
delegate other types of power. 88 Congress may therefore possess
more leeway in delegating the power to reduce spending than in
delegating the power to increase taxes, even though each action is a
means of reducing the deficit, and each requires the Executive to
engage in the same kind of economic analysis and forecasting.
3.

Stage C

Congress disapproves the Treasury's automatic income tax increase but approves the spending cuts ordered by the President in
order to conform to the Comptroller General's report. Congress
meets the statutory deadline requiring action within twenty-four
hours of receipt of the reports from the Comptroller General and
the Secretary of the Treasury, and limits its debate to one hour, as
provided by statute. In meeting these statutory time limits, Congress complies with the strict prohibition against stopping the clock,
and respects the statutory provision requiring unanimous consent
by roll call vote to waive these rules.
Comment. By approving the spending cut but not the tax increase, Congress fails to meet the deficit reduction target and negates the purposes of prior deficit-reduction legislation. Thus,
Congress abdicates its responsibility for dealing with the deficit and,
by default, delegates this responsibility to the President. In this cri87

8

.1. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
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sis situation, however, Congress conforms to its strict limitations on
debate.
This stage illustrates a Congress that appears paralyzed by its
own rules, and may even welcome this paralysis as an excuse for
avoiding difficult decisions on tax increases and further cuts in
spending. Prior judicial guidance might have helped, by defining
the circumstances in which Congress may overturn or violate its
rules of procedure.
4.

Stage D

The President reduces spending by impounding the amount
necessary to compensate for the disapproved tax increase, thereby
meeting the deficit reduction target. The President fails to send a
rescission request to Congress and ignores congressional objections
when the Comptroller General reports this impoundment to
Congress.
Comment. In this emergency situation, the President purports to
exercise inherent powers, ignoring an apparently irresponsible
Congress.89
5. Stage E
Members of Congress bring suit.
Comment. At issue here is whether members of Congress have
standing. Courts are more willing of late to resolve disputes within
the government. 0° Bowsher stands as a manifestation of this willingness, despite the presence of private parties whose standing as
plaintiffs played an important part in the outcome. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in another case concerning congressional
standing even before deciding Bowsher.9 ' Decisions on the scope of
89 The nation suffers a crisis of some proportion every time the government runs
out of money and sends its personnel home because the new fiscal year starts before
Congress enacts appropriations. See supra note 82.
The Court examined the limits of the President's emergency powers in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally L. FISHER, supra note 19,

at 287-92 (reviewing Executive's prerogative to act in accordance with his own perception of public good); C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT
IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 209-314 (1948) (noting inherent problems that presiden-

tial governments experience in securing emergency power for Executive in time of
crisis).
90 See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F. 2d 21, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that congressional plaintiffs had standing to challenge President's allegedly improper exercise of his
pocket veto power), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987);
Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 512-17 (D.D.C. 1986) (finding
U.S. Senator had standing to sue to assert his power to vote on membership associated
with FOMC).
91 In Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1985), see supra note 90. the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 3, 1986. Burke v. Barnes, 106 S. C. 1258
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congressional standing to litigate against other governmental officials or branches indicate, to a considerable extent, how far courts
will go in resolving the government's internal disputes.
CONCLUSION

Bowsher suggests that in future cases the Court will determine
pragmatically how much congressional experimentation with
macrobudgeting it will allow and which issues will form the basis of
the Court's decision. Clearly the Court is not always obliged to address every justiciable issue. The selection of issues for resolution is
a matter of judgment; determining which issues are justiciable may
require further balancing. In addition, courts lack power to eliminate some sources of budgetary problems, such as those resulting
from the style of campaigning for elective political office 92 and decisions on whether to adopt constitutional amendments. Most potential issues, however, are justiciable, or could be treated as justiciable
by a court willing to provide guidance to society.
Bowsher gave the Court an opportunity to provide guidance on
most, if not all, of the issues raised in the above hypothetical cases.
Either by basing its decision on different grounds or by stating, in
dictum, that certain parts of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act approached the outer limits of tolerance (or raised serious constitutional questions), the Court could have given the nation much
needed guidance on the budget process, an issue that rivals in importance virtually any other that the Court has ever faced. 93 Instead, the Court gave priority to achieving other goals, such as
limiting the independence of the independent agencies while withholding significant clarification of the limits. Had the Court provided more guidance on budget-related issues at this time, Congress
and the President would have listened. Unfortunately, the Court
may not have another such opportunity for a long time-and by
then, the time for effective judicial resolution of budgetary problems
(1986). The Court decided Bowlsher on July 7, 1986. 106 S. Ct. at 3181. The Court
subsequently vacated Barnes as moot. 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987).
92
For example, no court can solve the potential budget problems resulting from
the political pressure placed on candidates who promise big spending to the poor and
middle class who cast the votes, and at the same time promise low taxes to the rich who
pay the campaign costs and symbolize economic opportunities after the end of the candidates' government service. For a thorough discussion of the role of financing in political campaigns, see Symposium, .M1oney in Politics: Political Campaign Finance Reform, 10
HASTINGS CONSr. L.Q. 463 (1983).
93 For a general discussion of the legal structure and rules governing fiscal policy,
see Conycrs, Social Reform and Law Reform: Toward an Econoijh Bill of Rights. 1983 l)E-.
C.I,. REv. I 121; Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. Cui. L. REV. 271 (1977):
Elliott, supra note 14; Symposium, Agendasfor Dealing with Deficits. 37 Nxr't. "lx.. 261
(1984).
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94
may have passed.

S.4
I am concerned that a massive breakdown in the budgetary process could lead to
serious social and political consequences, including pressures for radical changes in our
governmental institutions.

